The Lai-Massey scheme, proposed by Vaudenay, is a modified structure in the International Data Encryption Algorithm cipher. A family of block ciphers, named FOX, were built on the Lai-Massey scheme. Impossible differential cryptanalysis is a powerful technique used to recover the secret key of block ciphers. This paper studies the impossible differential cryptanalysis of the Lai-Massey scheme with affine orthomorphism for the first time. Firstly, we prove that there always exist 4-round impossible differentials of a Lai-Massey cipher having a bijective F-function. Such 4-round impossible differentials can be used to help find 4-round impossible differentials of FOX64 and FOX128. Moreover, we give some sufficient conditions to characterize the existence of 5-, 6-, and 7-round impossible differentials of Lai-Massey ciphers having a substitution-permutation (SP) F-function, and we observe that if Lai-Massey ciphers having an SP Ffunction use the same diffusion layer and orthomorphism as a FOX64, then there are indeed 5-and 6-round impossible differentials. These results indicate that both the diffusion layer and orthomorphism should be chosen carefully so as to make the Lai-Massey cipher secure against impossible differential cryptanalysis.
I. Introduction
Background
Nowadays, the most powerful known attacks on block ciphers are differential cryptanalysis [1] and linear cryptanalysis [2] . These attacks have been efficiently applied to many known ciphers. Therefore, many block cipher structures with a provable security against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis have been studied [3] - [8] . However, a provable security against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis is not enough to prove the security of block ciphers, because other different cryptanalyses may be applied in the future. For instance, the 3-round Feistel structure, whose round functions are bijective, has a provable security against differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis [9] , but there exists a 5-round impossible differential characteristic, which means that impossible differential cryptanalysis [10] may be much more powerful than differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate the ability of each block cipher to resist also impossible differential cryptanalysis.
Impossible differential cryptanalysis, proposed by Biham and Knudsen, is one of the most popular cryptanalytic tools for use against block ciphers. The main idea behind impossible differential cryptanalysis is to use an impossible differential that shows that a particular differential characteristic can not occur for the correct key, which means that if these differential characteristics are satisfied under the tested key, then it cannot be the correct one. Moreover, impossible differential cryptanalysis has shown its superiority over differential cryptanalysis in many block ciphers, such as International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [11] , Skipjack [12] , AES [13] ,
Contribution and Outline
The contribution of this paper presents the original evaluation on the impossible differentials of Lai-Massey ciphers for the first time. Firstly, we prove that 4-round impossible differential always exist if the F-function is bijective. Secondly, we give some sufficient conditions to characterize the existence of 5-, 6-, and 7-round impossible differentials of Lai-Massey ciphers having a substitution-permutation (SP) Ffunction and observe that if the Lai-Massey ciphers having an SP F-function use the same diffusion layer and orthomorphism as a FOX64, then there are indeed 5-and 6-round impossible differentials.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we will describe the Lai-Massey scheme along with some preliminaries. The existence of the impossible differentials of the Lai-Massey cipher having either an SP or an SPS Ffunction will be discussed in Section III. Section IV concludes this paper.
II. Preliminaries In this paper, let group G = {0, 1} n . We define the group operation + as the bit-wise exclusive OR ⊕. Then, the round function can be rewritten as
.
In particular, to ensure the similarity of encryption and decryption of the Lai-Massey cipher, the σ in the last round is always omitted.
Description of FOX
FOX is a family of block ciphers designed by Junod and Vaudenay in 2004, which is the result of a joint project with the company MediaCrypt AG in Switzerland. FOX adopts a modified structure of the Lai-Massey Scheme, which can be proven to have sound pseudorandom properties in the LubyRackoff paradigm, as well as having decorrelation in hesitance properties. FOX has two versions, both have a variable number of rounds, the exact number of which being dependent upon key sizes. The first one, FOX64/k/r, has a 64-bit block size with a variable key length -a multiple of 8 and up to 256 bits. The second, FOX128/k/r, uses a 128-bit block size with variable key length and round number. The original FOX design suggests these two ciphers should be iterated for 16 rounds. The round function of FOX uses a substitutionpermutation-substitution (SPS) structure with three layers of sub-key addition. The key schedule of FOX is very complex as it uses the round function as a compress function to generate sub-keys from the master key. Here, we give only a brief description of the F-function, f, of FOX64, for further details we refer you to [21] .
The round function, f, comprises three main parts: a substitution part, denoted sigma4; a diffusion part, denoted mu4; and a round key addition part. 4 and multiplies it with a maximum distance separable (MDS) matrix to output a column vector of the same size. The branch number of the MDS matrix is five. The MDS matrix is defined as follows: 
Moreover, the σ transformation used in FOX64 is the linear orthomorphism ( , In this section, we give the definition and properties of the χ-function and then give the definition of the Hamming weight.
Definition 3 (χ-function). For
Therefore, for ( (2 )) ,
is some non-zero value at the ith position. Let ( (2 )) m n i e GF ∈ be a vector such that ( ) ,
is a vector whose ith component is one, while other [e j = 0 (j ≠ i)] components are zero. The χ-function adheres to the following properties outlined in Property 2: Property 2 [28] . A. For any difference ( (2 )) ,
, where p i is the ith column vector of diffusion layer P, then if ∆X = e i , we have
define the number of nonzero components in X by ( )
In this paper, we only consider the Lai-Massey scheme with affine orthomorphism :{0, 1} {0, 1} , we can list the properties of σ and τ as follows:
Property 3.
(1) Proof. As described in Fig. 1 , from the encryption direction, if
, 
From the decryption direction, if the output difference of the fourth round is
■ From Proposition 1, we can obtain a new kind of impossible differential of a 4-round FOX cipher as the following corollary. In addition, they presented a chosen plaintexts impossible differential cryptanalysis of the FOX64. In Corollary 1, the only requirement is that 0, α ≠ which implies that perhaps we can present a distinct known plaintexts attack on FOX, which is a more realistic model. Moreover, for a Feistel scheme, if the F-function is bijective, then it will have a 5-round impossible differential. In Proposition 1, we know that the Lai-Massey scheme only has a 4-round impossible differential if the F-function is bijective.
Analysis on 5-Round Lai-Massey Cipher Having an SP Round Function
From now on, let σ Μ and τ Μ denote the corresponding matrix of the linear transformation σ andτ, respectively. is a 5-round impossible differential of the Lai-Massey cipher having an SP structure. ⊕I)(γ)
σ (e i ) e i
Proof. As described in Fig. 2 , if the input difference is (e i , e i ), then the input difference of f 2 will be ( ) ( ). Then, 
. this is a contradiction. Thus, ( , ) ( , ( )) e e e io e → / is a 5-round impossible differential.
3. Analysis on 6-Round Lai-Massey Scheme Having an SP Round Function Fig. 3 . Impossible differential of 6-round Lai-Massey cipher having an SP round function.
and 2 # , σ σ is a 6-round impossible differential of a LaiMassey cipher having an SP structure. Proof. As described in Fig. 3 and similar to Proposition 2, when 
Thus, the following equation holds: 
Assume that there exist 1 1 , ... , . 
. and B, respectively. Proof. As described in Fig. 4 , from the encryption direction, if 
. ( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )) or e or e io e or e → / is a 7-round impossible differential of this special Lai-Massey cipher having an SP structure.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an impossible differential cryptanalysis on Lai-Massey ciphers. By comprehensively analyzing the properties of the diffusion layer and the σ function on the Lai-Massey ciphers, we gave some sufficient conditions that characterized the existence of 4-round impossible differentials of Lai-Massey cipher having a bijective F-function and 5-, 6-, 7-round impossible differentials of Lai-Massey ciphers having an SP F-function. These results indicate that both the diffusion layer and the σ function should be chosen carefully so as to make the Lai-Massey cipher secure against impossible differential cryptanalysis, and the propositions presented in this paper should be considered when designing a block cipher. Moreover, the problem of how to suitably design the diffusion layer and σ function of a LaiMassey scheme so as to resist cryptanalyses is still an open one.
